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RETHINKING THE FEDERAL COURTS: WHY NOW IS TIME 
FOR CONGRESS TO REVISIT THE NUMBER OF JUDGES THAT SIT 
ON FEDERAL APPELLATE PANELS 
MITCHELL W. BILD*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great diffi-
culty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”1 James Madison’s 
words reflect the understanding that the separation of powers principle 
enshrined in the United States Constitution is not mere decoration; it is the 
deep-rooted foundation in our governmental structure that results from 
well-understood limitations on the people’s ability to govern.2 Accordingly, 
the Framers erected walls of separation between the three federal branches 
to compel the branches to control themselves. The exceptions that over-
come this structural framework are few and well-defined. 
The walls separating the judiciary are particularly impenetrable.3
While the Executive and Legislative Branches exercise political ambition,4
the Judicial Branch was intended to exercise wholly independent and non-
partisan judgment.5 The Framers made it clear that the importance of judi-
* Juris Doctor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2020; Bachelor of Arts, Michigan State University. 
I would like to thank Professor Kent Streseman for his support, encouragement, and advice throughout 
the completion of this note, as well as his instruction on how to become an effective persuasive writer 
and advocate. I would also like to thank Professor Elizabeth De Armond for teaching me how to write 
clearly and analytically at the highest level and for her unwavering support and confidence in me as a 
legal writer. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Hal R. Morris for his advice and suggestions as I 
moved toward the final version of this note. 
1.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2.  See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 
(1976)). 
 3.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385, 407 (1989) (identifying a distinction be-
tween the nonpartisan Judicial Branch and the other “political branches”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 
465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The complete independence of the courts of 
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”). 
 4.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(referring to the executive branch as having “force” and the legislature as having “will”). 
 5.  See id. (“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may 
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336 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
cial independence and impartiality cannot be understated.6 In recent years, 
and especially since Senate Republicans refused to hold judicial confirma-
tion hearings for Judge Merrick Garland, the federal courts have come to 
the fore of national discourse.7 Yet this national discourse is overwhelm-
ingly negative.8 Supreme Court justice nominations have elevated into 
incredibly controversial political events, which bring into the spotlight the 
ways in which the courts have become analogous to the political branches. 
Because this flies in the face of the Framers’ most basic worries about the 
Judicial Branch, it deserves our immediate attention. 
This Note illuminates how political influence has breached the walls 
containing the judiciary’s enormous power, and why that breach requires 
an immediate solution. It then proposes that increasing the number of judg-
es that sit on each federal appellate panel from three to five is a practical 
solution that would restore judicial integrity and independence across the 
board. It will become clear that, while increasing the number of judges on 
each appellate panel also increases the caseload of an already overworked 
federal judiciary (and raises other notable concerns), such a solution is 
necessary to preserve the Constitution’s most sacred principles. 
Part II of this Note introduces the history of the federal courts and 
what led to the adoption of three-judge appellate panels. Part II also com-
pares different judicial systems that already utilize five-judge panels. Part 
III explains why three-judge federal appellate panels should no longer be 
the norm. Lastly, Part IV proposes that five-judge federal appellate panels 
become the norm as a means of restoring and preserving judicial integrity 
and independence. 
Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of 1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647, 653 (1995) (noting 
that the Constitution secures judicial independence first by requiring life tenure, and second by prohibit-
ing decreases in judges’ salaries). 
 6.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting Article III judges life tenure); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 464-65, 468-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the im-
portance of judicial independence). 
 7.  See Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters Now,
NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-
merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/9SBK-J348] (explaining the rise in 
national discourse about judicial nominations since 2016). 
 8.  See, e.g., Sean Illing, The Case for Abolishing the Supreme Court, VOX (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:10 
AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/12/17950896/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-constitution 
[https://perma.cc/BD6F-Q5N2] (discussing the harmful effects of the Supreme Court’s political influ-
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II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Basic Structure of the Federal Courts and Three-Judge Appellate 
Panels 
Congress first established the judiciary’s framework in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.9 The original structure of the federal court system, however, 
was drastically different than modern-day federal courts, with the most 
notable difference being the absence of intermediate appellate courts alto-
gether.10 The Judiciary Act of 1789 initially established a three-tiered judi-
cial system comprised of one Supreme Court, three circuit courts, and 
fifteen district courts.11 As opposed to the current judicial framework—
which consists of a trial level, appellate level, and the Supreme Court—the 
original framework had two trial levels; the district courts handled “issues 
of relative triviality,” whereas the circuit courts dealt with more notable 
trial matters as well as appellate matters.12 Because the circuit courts did 
not have designated judges, any combination of two Supreme Court justic-
es and a district judge within a circuit heard appeals at each of the circuit 
courts.13 This is the first sign that Congress favored three-judge appellate 
panels. 
After several congressional acts modified the Supreme Court’s com-
position and jurisdiction over federal questions,14 Congress passed the Ju-
diciary Act of 1891 (the “Evarts Act”) to restructure the federal courts.15
The Evarts Act marked the inception of the federal intermediate appellate 
courts,16 though Congress’s vision of the intermediate appellate courts in 
1891 focused primarily on “‘harmoniz[ing] and unify[ing] the national 
law.’”17
 9.  46 DONALD J. SAVERY, FRANK C. CORSO & WILLIAM T. HARRINGTON, MASS. PRACTICE,
FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 1:2 (2d ed. 2017). 
 10.  ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 7:1 
(2018 ed.). 
 11.  SAVERY, supra note 9, § 1:2 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Cong. ch. 20, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 73, 
73-74 (1789) (prior to amendments)). 
 12.  Id. (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9-11, 1 Stat. at 76-79).  
 13.  Id.
 14.  Id.
 15.  Id. (citing Judiciary Act of 1891, 51 Cong. ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). 
 16.  See Judiciary Act of 1891, § 2, 26 Stat. at 826 (“[T]here is hereby created in each circuit a 
circuit court of appeals . . . .”). 
 17.  Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Examining Accepted Premises of Regional 
Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 230 (2011) (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Crowded 
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 542, 602-03 (1969)); see Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the 
Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REV. 535, 580 (2010) (“[T]he whole point of the Evarts Act [Judiciary Act 
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From this point forward, Congress required that three judges hear ap-
peals.18 Without any recorded legislative history to show the Fifty-First 
Congress’s intention, Alexander Lamar, Jr. uncovered what is apparently 
the prevailing explanation behind having three appellate decisionmakers in 
1891: tradition.19 Even after Congress passed the Evarts Act, “[t]he frame-
work of the courts” remained “fundamentally unchanged since the Judici-
ary Act of 1789,”20 at least in part because “[t]hree-judge tribunals had 
decided appeals since the circuit courts were created in 1789.”21 Even as 
Congress re-codified the Judiciary Acts into the Judicial Code of 1948, it 
sought to preserve the “three-judge tradition.”22
Yet over the next few decades this “tradition” became more resolute. 
Whereas for over 150 years Congress blindly adhered to the three-judge 
tradition, by 1981 it expressed an intention to safeguard institutional legit-
imacy by imposing more stringent requirements as to the number of the 
judges that adjudicate federal appeals.23
B. Moving Toward Codifying Three-Judge Panels 
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress refined the three-judge 
tradition to become more meaningful. Congress first recognized the practi-
cal benefits of three-judge courts in 1903, and therefore began its departure 
from blindly adhering to the three-judge tradition. It determined, for exam-
ple, that certain antitrust and railroad disputes were of such public im-
portance that they deserved expedited resolution before a panel of at least 
three circuit judges.24 And in 1906, Congress determined that challenges of 
orders handed down by the Interstate Commerce Commission deserved 
similar treatment before three circuit judges.25
Congress enacted its most sweeping legislation favoring three-judge 
determinations with the Three-Judge Court Act of 1910, though the Act 
Congress’s vision of the federal appellate courts has changed—in a manner that supports this Note’s 
conclusion—is discussed infra Section II.B. 
 18.  See Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 17, at 231, 231 n.183. 
 19.  Alexander Lamar, Jr., En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating 
Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 571, 573, 591 (1965) (noting that three 
judges had been hearing appeals since 1789 because of “tradition”). 
 20.  Id. at 568. 
 21.  Id. at 571. 
 22.  Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 23.  See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 9 (1981). 
 24.  The Three-Judge Court Act of 1910: Purpose, Procedure and Alternatives, 62 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY, AND POL. SCIENCE 205, 205 n.1 (1971) (citing Act of Feb. 11, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-82, 
ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, 823 (1903)). 
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established a three-judge trial procedure instead of a three-judge appellate
procedure.26 The Three-Judge Court Act is instructive nonetheless, as it 
stemmed from the states’ strong dislike of deference to only a single dis-
trict judge with the power to enjoin entire state regulatory schemes in the 
name federal interstate commerce interests.27 In other words, the states 
wanted more legitimacy in federal court decisions that dealt with particu-
larly sensitive and important issues, such as interstate commerce disputes. 
The goal of the Three-Judge Court Act, then, was to “offer[ ] the states the 
more thorough deliberation of three federal judges” with respect to issues 
states thought were vital to their own interests.28 As Senator Overman re-
marked in support of the Act, “[w]henever one judge stands up in a state 
and enjoins the [state], the people resent it . . . whereas if three judges de-
clare that a statute is unconstitutional the people would rest easy.”29 Dec-
ades later, the public still saw the three-judge option “as an important 
palliative” to concerns about the federal judiciary’s power.30
Congress abolished the old circuit courts one year after enacting the 
Three-Judge Court Act and permitted the judges on those courts to serve on 
the circuit courts of appeals.31 Congress there reiterated that the courts of 
appeals would hear appeals as a three-judge court. Yet although the 1911 
Act added judgeships in the Second, Seventh, and Eight Circuits, it failed 
to address whether courts of appeals with more than three assigned judges 
would sit in “divisions” (or panels) of three or if they would sit en banc for 
every appeal.32 By 1938, however, the concept of separate three-judge divi-
sions implicitly developed with an increase in judgeships because nine of 
the eleven circuit courts of appeals sat more than three judges.33 Since the 
1911 Act permitted only three judges to hear each case, “divisional hear-
 26.  Three-Judge Court Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (1910) 
(also codified as an amendment to the judicial code at Pub. L. No. 61-475, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1087, 
1162-63 (1911)). 
 27.  Three-Judge Court Act, supra note 24, at 206 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
 28.  Id. (citing the remarks of Senator Brown, 45 Cong. Rec. 7257 (1910), and Senator Overman, 
45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910)). 
 29.  Id. at 206 n.10 (citing 45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910)); see also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 
U.S. 111, 127 (1965) (“Requiring the collective judgment of three judges . . . [was] designed to safe-
guard important state interests.”); 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. §
4234 (3d ed. 2018) (“It was thought of Congress that there would be less public resentment if enforce-
ment of the state statute were stayed by three judges rather than one . . . .”). 
 30.  See Three-Judge Court Act, supra note 24, at 207; see also MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 
799, 804 (1975) (noting that the congressional policy behind three-judge courts was “the saving of state 
and federal statutes from improvident doom at the hands of a single judge”). 
 31.  Lamar, Jr., supra note 19, at 570 (citing Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, ch. 231, § 
297, 36 Stat. 1087, 1168 (1911)). 
 32.  Id.
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ings had in effect developed within most circuit courts of appeals.”34 Be-
cause “[t]hree-judge tribunals had decided appeals since the circuit courts 
were created in 1789[,] three-judge decisions therefore were acceptable 
even after three judges had in effect become a division of the court.”35 This 
was especially true given Congress’s newfound belief that seating more 
decisionmakers legitimized the outcome of cases.36
Congress amended the Judicial Code again in 1913 to require three-
judge district courts when “enjoin[ing] enforcement of an administrative 
order made by an administrative board or commission acting under a state 
statute.”37 Congress amended the Code once more in 1925 to require three 
district judges when deciding on a motion for a permanent injunction, 
whereas they were previously required for only interlocutory injunctions.38
And in 1937, Congress imposed a three-judge requirement to enjoin Acts 
of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality.39 While the Acts between 
1910 and 1948 centered on three-judge trial court panels, they suggest that 
Congress chose to increase the number of decisionmakers for each case 
because doing so demonstrated institutional legitimacy in the face of polar-
izing and controversial legal problems, whereas the original goal was to 
simply “‘harmonize and unify the national law.’”40
Congress solidified the modern conception of three-judge appellate 
panels, as opposed to three-judge courts, when it established Title 28 of the 
United States Code in 1948.41 This Act permitted each circuit court of ap-
peals to “authorize the hearing and determination of cases and controver-
sies by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges,”42 and provided 
for the courts of appeals’ ability to hear cases en banc,43 among other pro-
visions. Despite extensive legislative actions taken between the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 and the establishment of Title 28 of the United States Code, 
there is little, if any, legislative history to explain with any certainty the 
 34.  Id. at 570-71. 
 35.  Id. at 571. 
 36.  See Three-Judge Court Act, supra note 24, at 207; see also MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 
799, 804 (1975) (noting that the congressional policy behind three-judge courts was “the saving of state 
and federal statutes from improvident doom at the hands of a single judge”). 
 37.  WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 4234. 
 38.  Id. (citing Judicial Code Amendments, Pub. L. No. 68-415, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 938 (1925)). 
 39.  Id. (citing Act of Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-352, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (1937)); 
Three-Judge Court Act, supra note 24, at 206 n.9 (same). 
 40.  Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 17, at 230 (quoting Carrington, supra note 17, at 602-
03). 
 41.  Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 869 (1948) (codified as 28 
U.S.C. § 1, et seq.). 
 42.  Id. at 871 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)). 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 175 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
13 BILD MACRO 1 EIC 5.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:42 PM 
2020] RETHINKING THE FEDERAL COURTS 341 
reasons behind selecting three judges—as opposed to any other number—
to hear appeals.44
But the Supreme Court provided much needed clarity on this point just 
five years after Congress created Title 28 in Western Pacific Railroad 
Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.45 There, the Court relied on the Re-
viser’s Notes to the 1948 codification of Title 28 to explain the provisions 
requiring three-judge divisions and permitting en banc review.46 The Re-
viser’s Notes suggest that those provisions—28 U.S.C. § 46(b) and (c), 
respectively—”continue[ ] the tradition of a three-judge appellate court . . . 
unless rehearing [e]n banc is ordered.”47 The Reviser’s Notes shed light on 
the particular reasons for continuing that tradition by explaining that such a 
number “makes judges available for other assignments, and permits a rota-
tion of judges in such a manner as to give to each a maximum of time for 
the preparation of opinions.”48 Because this language sought to explain the 
benefits of permitting en banc review, the Reviser’s Notes simply ex-
plained three-judge divisions as necessary to distinguish ordinary appellate 
hearings from full-court hearings.49
Without clearly pointing to a reason for starting with three-judge ap-
pellate courts in 1891, Western Pacific Railroad provides insight as to why 
Congress has not changed the number of judges that hear ordinary ap-
peals.50 It recognized that the Judiciary Committee, when recommending 
codification of three-judge divisions under the new Title 28, took “‘great 
care . . . to make no changes in the existing law’”51 because Congress 
should accord significant deference to “‘the judges whose day to day ad-
ministration of the various provisions of the Judicial Code gives them a 
special knowledge of these matters.’”52 Put differently, laws about judicial 
administration should center on the needs of the Judiciary itself and, absent 
 44.  Note that this proposition assumes a distinction between Congress’s desire to increase the 
number of judges that hear particular cases and Congress’s cognizant determination that three is the 
proper number of judges to hear appeals. This proposition suggests that the former is clear, but that the 
latter is inconclusive. 
 45.  See 345 U.S. at 254-58. 
 46.  See id. at 255-57 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A6-A7 (1947)). 
 47.  Id. at 256 n.13 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A7). 
 48.  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A7). 
 49.  See id.
 50.  See id. at 256-57; see also Whitney R. Harris, Survey of the Federal Judicial Code – The 
1948 Revision and First Interpretive Decisions, 3 SMU L. J. 229, 248 (1949) (citing congressional 
records) (“The purpose of the 1948 revision of the judicial code was not to change, but to clarify and 
simplify the law.”). 
 51.  Western Pac. R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 257 (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 2 (1948)). 
52.  Id. (quoting Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 
and H.R. 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 19 (1947) (state-
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a reason to deviate from three-judge appellate courts, Congress has de-
ferred to tradition.53 This Note explains infra Part III why circumstances 
today provide plenty of reasons to deviate from this longstanding norm.54
C. Existing Five-Judge Panel Systems 
Several judicial systems have already adopted five-judge panels that 
assemble for particular purposes, which provide helpful insight into the 
benefits and the intentions behind increasing the number of judges that hear 
appeals. Louisiana, for instance, utilizes five-judge appellate panels in the 
most expansive manner, while the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit exemplifies Congress’s willingness to increase the number 
of judges that hear appeals.55
1. Louisiana’s Appellate Court System 
The Louisiana Constitution requires review before a five-judge appel-
late panel where “a judgment of a district court . . . is to be modified or 
reversed and one [appellate] judge dissents.”56 In 1973, Louisiana held a 
constitutional convention where it emphasized the need for such a require-
ment.57 According to the convention’s delegates, the trial judge in practice 
“count[s] as a vote during the initial three-judge court of appeal panel.”58 In 
actuality, then, a two-to-one decision to reverse the trial judge operates as a 
tie when including the district judge’s decision as a dissent.59 The reason-
ing was further explained at the convention by the provision’s sponsor: 
 53.  See id.
 54.  It is worthwhile to mention that the three subsequent amendments to the three-judge panel 
statute (and their respective legislative records) did nothing substantive with the statute as it relates to 
this Section. The 1978 amendment merely renamed appellate “divisions” as “panels.” Act of Oct. 20, 
1978, P.L. 95-486, § 5, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)). The 1996 amendment added 
a clause permitting senior judges to sit on en banc panels in certain circumstances. Act of Aug. 6, 1996, 
P.L. 104-175, § 1, 110 Stat. 1556 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C § 46(c)). The 1982 amendment, however, 
is discussed infra Section II.C.2. 
 55.  This Note addresses only two of the expanded panel systems in the United States. Louisiana 
and the Federal Circuit are not, by any means, the only judicial institutions that substantiate this Note’s 
ultimate conclusion. See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 22(i) (eff. July 1, 2017) (requiring a five-judge appellate 
panel to hear Workers’ Compensation Commission appeals); Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. 
Dudley, The Unpublished Rules of the Arkansas Court of Appeals: The Internal Rules and Procedures 
of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 109, 109, 114, 116-17 (2011) 
(discussing the use of six- and nine-judge appellate panels). 
 56.  LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B); LA. CT. APP. UNIF. R. 1-5. 
 57.  See Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 980 So.2d 634, 642 (La. 2008) (Victory, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing legislative history of the five-judge panel provision Louisiana’s Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1973). 
 58.  Id.
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Since the courts of appeal sit in rotating panels of three, never the same 
three judges at the same time, we are getting out of the same court of ap-
peal sometimes different results in almost identical cases. That is com-
pounded when you think of the fourth circuit having nine judges and 
they sit in panels of three. . . . [This provision] allows the verdict, the 
judgment of that district judge to be entitled to a little more weight than 
it’s got now. As [of] right now you can simply disagree with the district 
judge, two reversing, and that is the end of it. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [N]o two judges on an appellate court who read a cold record should 
be able to take what a district court has done after hearing a case for 
three days and subvert it by simply outvoting another judge. . . . 
. . . [I]n the interest of justice, it is not too much to ask an appellate court 
to have two more judges come in and read a record where one judge ve-
hemently dissents and says you have done the wrong thing by reversing 
the district judge. . . . [W]hen two judges can take a district court and re-
verse it simply almost on a whim, that is not justice . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he more people you have looking at the record the better chance 
that justice will prevail. . . . If we are going to review then let’s have as 
many possible [judges] which doesn’t impede the efficient operation of 
the court look at it. . . .60
Article V, § 8(B) of the Louisiana Constitution not only codified a 
means of improving institutional legitimacy consistent with this Note’s 
recommendations, but it is also consistent with the recent trends of Con-
gress as described supra Section II.B. 
What is more, Louisiana’s five-judge appellate panels are a product 
not of mere legislative discretion, but of constitutional mandate.61 The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court has noted that this procedure is an immensely far-
reaching requirement that has no articulable limitations other than the nec-
essary predicate circumstances.62 In Bank of New Orleans and Trust Com-
pany v. Seavey, for example, Louisiana’s High Court recognized that the 
five-judge appellate system is necessary in all circumstances involving a 
two-to-one appellate decision to reverse or modify a decision.63 Assuming 
that this threshold prerequisite is satisfied, it is immaterial whether the ap-
peal was interlocutory or from a final judgment, or whether the appeal in-
volves legal or factual issues, or whether the appellate court exercises 
 60.  Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 782 So.2d 606, 621 n.3 (La. 2001) (Knoll J., dissenting) (quoting 
TRANSCRIPTS FROM THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VOL. VI, at 756 (1973)). 
 61.  See LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B); see also State v. Allen, 84 So.3d 1288, 1288-89 (La. 2012) 
(emphasizing that there is no excuse for failing to adhere to the five-judge mandate in the state constitu-
tion). 
 62.  See Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354, 356-57 (La. 1980). 
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supervisory or appellate jurisdiction, for the constitution’s language “is 
broad and bears no limitations.”64
That Louisiana made such a permanent and wide-ranging procedural 
change emphasizes not only the feasibility of this type of system, but also 
the critical importance of making such a radical change. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s Five-Judge Panel System 
Congress, too, has imposed a system of five-judge appellate panels. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has different 
panel rules than the rest of the circuit courts of appeals.65 Section 46(c) of 
the Judicial Code says that the Federal Circuit “may sit in panels of more 
than three judges if its rules so provide,” but that the rest of the appellate 
courts may not utilize panels of more than three judges except with respect 
to en banc proceedings.66
Congressional proceedings leading up to the enactment of the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 198267 suggest that Congress has shifted its 
attitude regarding the number of judges that should serve on each appellate 
panel. Specifically, they provide additional support for the proposition that 
the federal appellate courts need at least three judges per panel.68 The Sen-
ate Report for this 1982 enactment explains that the Federal Circuit could 
seat more than three judges on each panel because the nature of cases it 
was created to hear are of particular difficulty or importance.69 The Report 
declared that, because “to persevere both the appearance and the reality of 
justice . . . the disposition of an appeal should be the collective product of 
at least three minds.”70 The Report also criticized existing law for permit-
ting federal appellate panels of fewer than three judges in certain circum-
stances,71 concluding that “such a practice should not become 
institutionalized” with respect to the Federal Circuit.72
The Senate Report even intimated that interests serving the Federal 
Circuit regarding the size of each panel may also extend to the rest of the 
 64.  Id.
 65.  See 28 U.S.C.A § 46(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5). 
 66.  Id.
 67.  Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified in 28 
U.S.C. §§ 176-77, 462-63, 714-15, 1295, 1631, 2077, and 2522). 
 68.  See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 9 (1981). 
 69.  Id.
 70.  Id.
 71.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56). 
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federal circuits.73 It explained that, under § 46, “some federal appellate 
courts have used panels of two judges for motions and for dispositions” in 
relatively insubstantial cases.74 But “[b]ecause of apprehensions that deci-
sions at the appellate level by fewer than three judges carry the risk of be-
ing less sound or less balanced, there is a widespread belief that every
decisions [sic] of an appeal should be the collective product of at least 
three minds.”75
The Federal Circuit did not ignore the option to expand appellate pan-
els either; it sat expanded panels of five, seven, and even nine judges sever-
al times since its creation.76 In 1997, pursuant to § 46(c), the Federal 
Circuit promulgated its own rule providing for the case-by-case determina-
tion of the number of judges that serve on each appellate panel.77 Admit-
tedly, however, the practice of seating panels of more than three judges has 
waned.78 Significantly, though, this practice has waned only because the 
problems that necessitated expanded panels in the first place have largely 
vanished. Namely, that the Federal Circuit’s judges have built such a re-
spectable reputation among legal scholars and practitioners negates any 
concerns over institutional legitimacy.79
Part III next discusses why the reasons supporting five-judge appellate 
panels in Louisiana and in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals apply to the 
entirety of the federal appellate system. 
III. WHY THE THREE-JUDGE PANEL SYSTEM IS NO LONGER THE BEST
PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
This Note undeniably faces a steep uphill battle. Not only has the 
three-judge system remained traditional practice for well over 200 years, 
scholars and practitioners have never seriously questioned it on a broad 
scale.80 But frightening trends in the federal judiciary today oblige us to 
take a closer look at whether the justifications for keeping the three-judge 
tradition remain valid. Section III.A revives the notion first suggested by 
 73.  Id. at 9. 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id.
 76.  Elizabeth I. Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 813, 822 (2011). 
 77.  U.S. CT. APP. FED. CIR. R. 47.2(a).  
 78.  Winston, supra note 76, at 823. 
 79.  See id. at 824 (“As the Federal Circuit has matured; gaining experience, prominence, and 
acceptance by the bar; these concerns have diminished.”). 
 80.  Research has uncovered only one scholarly article that proposes expanding federal appeals 
court panels to five judges. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial 
Review in Administrative Law: Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 355-61 
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Alexander Hamilton that the Judicial Branch can, under the right circum-
stances, be the most dangerous branch of government. Section III.B then 
advocates that we should focus our attention on the federal appellate courts, 
not the Supreme Court, when considering solutions to the problem posed in 
Section III.A. 
A. The Federal Judiciary Is the Most Dangerous Branch of           
Government 
1. The Original Understanding of Article III Suggests That the         
Judiciary Ought to Be Feared. 
The Framers, via the Constitution, set up robust structural protections 
to free judges from external influences.81 Concurring in Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Association, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas discussed at 
length the judiciary’s role as a check on the political branches.82 He ex-
plained that the Framers worried the courts would “be induced to embark 
too far in the political views” of the other branches,83 and would thus be-
come less of an impartial “check” on the other branches.84 He provided this 
insight to undermine courts’ longstanding deference to executive agency 
determinations.85
The most basic, but important, assumption underlying the Framers’ 
creation of the judiciary was that “Article III judges would exercise inde-
pendent judgment.”86 Yet this assumption was simply the Federalists’ justi-
fication for opposing the Anti-Federalists’ concerns about the inherent 
dangers of the judiciary’s interpretive power.87 The Anti-Federalists feared 
that “judges ‘w[ould] not confine themselves to any fixed or established 
rules, but w[ould] determine, according to what appears to them, the reason 
and spirit of the constitution.’”88 The Federalist response, however, “as-
sur[ed] the public that judges would be guided ‘by strict rules and prece-
 81.  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215-22 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing protections to ensure that the judiciary does not get too powerful). 
 82.  Id. at 1217. 
 83.  Id. at 1218. 
 84.  See id. at 1217 (“[Deference to agency interpretations] represents a transfer of judicial power 
to the Executive Branch, and it amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on 
the political branches.”). 
 85.  See id. at 1213. 
 86.  See id. at 1217. 
 87.  See id. (explaining the back-and-forth debate between the Anti-Federalists and the Federal-
ists). 
 88.  Id. (quoting 2 Essays of Brutus (Jan. 31, 1788), THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 420 (H. 
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dents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case 
that comes before them.’”89 The debate between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, then, was about how best to tame the “dangers inherent in the 
[interpretive] power” that “made the Judiciary the most dangerous 
branch.”90
The Federalists acknowledged, however, that the concept of judicial 
independence did not refer only to independence from “external threats,” 
such as political influence, but also “from the ‘internal threat’ of ‘human 
will.’”91 They recognized that truly “[i]ndependent judgment required 
judges to decide cases in accordance with the law of the land, not in ac-
cordance with pressures placed upon them.”92 The Framers therefore wrote 
into the Constitution impenetrable walls—or what were at least believed to 
be impenetrable—around Article III judges to insulate them from any ex-
ternal political influences, such as lifetime tenure and fixed compensa-
tion.93 And the safeguards to protect against internal influences—force of 
will, not of judgment—included the rules of interpretation and precedent 
that have always applied to judicial bodies.94 Upon the Constitution’s rati-
fication, the judiciary became a branch insulated from internal and external 
political influences95 and tamed to fulfill its constitutional duty and nothing 
more.96
This framework begs the question: What becomes of the Judiciary if 
internal or external political influences breach the walls erected by the 
Framers? The answer is that the Judicial Branch of the federal government 
would quickly transform from the weakest branch to the most dangerous 
branch. To be sure, Alexander Hamilton warned of this in FEDERALIST 
PAPER 78.97 There, Hamilton explained the Federalists’ response to Anti-
 89.  Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
 90.  Id. (citing Letters from the Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 315-16 (H. Storing ed., 1981)). 
 91.  Id. at 1217-18 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossit-
er ed., 1961)). 
 92.  Id. at 1218. 
 93.  See id.
 94.  See id. at 1217 (citing, inter alia, 1 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND, at 59-61 (1765)); see also Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Bal-
ance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (2004) (explain-
ing that the most important internal constraints on judicial power were stare decisis and canons of 
construction). 
 95.  See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1219 (“[T]he Judiciary[ is] insulated from both internal and external 
sources of bias . . . .”). 
 96.  See id. at 1218 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossit-
er ed., 1961)). 
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Federalist concerns over the broad interpretive power given to the judici-
ary.98 He added that the Federalists’ response “proves incontestably that the 
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of 
power,” and that “liberty of the people can never be endangered from” it. 99
But he qualified these bold assertions by pointing out that they remain true 
only “so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legisla-
ture and the executive.”100 Hamilton’s warning continued by explaining the 
consequences of breaching the judiciary’s insulation: 
[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers. And it proves, in the last place, that as 
liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have 
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments;
that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of 
the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separa-
tion; that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual 
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its coordinate 
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and 
independence as permanency in office, this quality [separation of the ju-
diciary from the other branches] may therefore be justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as 
the citadel of the public justice and the public security.101
Hamilton concluded that “[t]he complete independence of the courts 
of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”102 Given the 
grave unease in Hamilton’s warning, it follows that the Judicial Branch of 
the United States Government was, still is, and must continue to be but a 
tamed beast.103
2. The Supreme Court’s Shift in Stare Decisis Analysis Suggests That 
Political Influence Has Breached the Barriers Separating the Judicial 
Branch. 
The first major indication that Hamilton’s fears became reality arose 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1984, the Supreme Court gave little weight 
to stare decisis in constitutional cases.104 As Justice Brandeis famously put 
 98.  See generally id.
 99.  Id. at 464 (citing 1 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 181 (1748)). 
 100.  Id. at 464-65. 
 101.  Id. at 465 (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 102.  Id.
 103.  See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216-20 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483-84 (2011) (quoting FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton)) (explaining the necessity for judicial independence). 
 104.  See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (“[W]hen convinced of former error, this 
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it, whether to affirm prior decisions was “entirely within the discretion of 
the court.”105 But the Supreme Court has, over the last few decades, gradu-
ally adjusted its stare decisis jurisprudence to block politics from influenc-
ing that discretion (to the extent possible).106 In so doing, the Court has 
professed the necessity for a more rigid adherence to stare decisis.107 It 
predicted that a decision “to overrule under fire in the absence of the most 
compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the 
Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question” because it would appear 
that the Court is susceptible to political pressures.108
Threats to the Court’s institutional legitimacy in the 1980s and 
1990s—threats similar to those the Court faces today—caused members of 
the Court to fear just as Alexander Hamilton had. Following five successful 
Supreme Court nominations by Presidents Reagan and Bush, many feared 
“that the Court would be perceived as political in overruling precedents,” 
especially “liberal precedents.”109 This is primarily because discretionary 
stare decisis analysis—which relied on whether individual justices believed 
precedents were rightly decided—begged justices to apply their subjective 
preferences on what the law should be.110 Yet this type of analysis runs 
contrary to the well-settled notion that “judicial review rests on the ability 
of Justices to interpret the written constitution definitively, ‘to say what the 
law is,’”111 not what the law should be. To avoid this problem, the Court 
adopted a “special justifications” approach, which gives significant weight 
to precedent absent a “special justification” to overrule.112
The Supreme Court’s shifted stare decisis jurisprudence, though not 
immediately on point, instructs that the dangers enunciated by Alexander 
 105.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 106.  Compare Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405-09 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), with Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)) 
(“[A]ny departure from [precedent] demands special justification.”); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. 
Bar., 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter 
ed., 1961); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) (explaining that the courts’ limited role—
judgment, not force of will—plays a large role in the courts’ institutional authority and legitimacy); 
Emery G. Lee, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court’s New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional 
Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 586-87 (2002) (discussing how polarizing ideological differences in the 
courts “undermine the legitimacy judicial review” and, thus, influenced the Court’s decision to adopt a 
more rigid test to reconsider constitutional precedents). 
 107.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). 
 108.  Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“It should go without saying that 
the vitality of the constitutional principles . . . cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagree-
ment with them.”)). 
 109.  Lee, supra note 106, at 587. 
 110.  Id. at 586. 
 111.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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Hamilton in the eighteenth century are not merely theoretical; they are real 
and worthy of our immediate attention. 
3. Federal Judges Are Now Tools to Accomplish Political Agendas. 
Few would doubt that federal judicial nominations, and the hearings 
resulting therefrom, have become major political events. One need only 
make a simple Google search for the Merrick Garland, Neil Gorsuch, and 
Brett Kavanaugh nominations to learn the nature of their immensely con-
tentious proceedings (or lack thereof). The public outcry about the individ-
uals selected to serve on the Supreme Court does, however, provide clear 
insight into the role judges now play. They are no longer seen as passive 
advocates of the law, for “the idea of ‘Obama judges and Trump judges’ is 
entrenched in the public consciousness.”113 Rhetoric by those on both sides 
of the political aisle confirms this terrifying attitude toward what is sup-
posed to be the only impartial and nonpartisan branch of government.114
Federal courts’ favorable attitude toward functionalist jurisprudential 
philosophy115 certainly does not help tame the judicial beast. The Seventh 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of 
Indiana116 provides valuable insight in this regard. Hively, an adjunct pro-
fessor at Ivy Tech Community College, sued Ivy Tech pursuant to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for denying her full-time employment and 
promotion opportunities because of her sexual orientation.117 But Title VII 
did not expressly prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of 
 113.  Sandeep Gopalan, Trump v. Roberts Amplifies Public’s Loss of Trust in Institutions, THE HILL
(Nov. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/418155-trump-v-roberts-amplifies-
publics-loss-of-trust-in-institutions [https://perma.cc/7GVE-5ZPW]. 
 114.  See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/U3YW-4GLX] (criticizing “Obama judges”); 
Andrew Cohen, Trump vs. John Roberts, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-vs-john-roberts [https://perma.cc/KL7J-P4TR] (asserting 
that Chief Justice Roberts “helped give conservatives access to their dark money in political campaigns 
via Citizens United” and “helped them suppress Democratic votes by killing the preclearance provision 
of the Voting Rights Act”). 
 115.  “In contrast to the nonpolitical, immanent nature of formalism,” functionalism—also called 
pragmatism—is a more politicized form of jurisprudence, viewing the law instead “‘as an instrument 
for forwarding some independently desirable purpose given to it from the outside.’” Elizabeth Bahr & 
Josh Blackman, Youngstown’s Fourth Tier: Is There a Zone of Insight Beyond the Zone of Twilight?, 40 
U. MEM. L. REV. 541, 549 (2010) (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent 
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1988)). Functionalist judges, when it comes to respecting 
precedent, “‘want[ ] to come up with the best decision having in mind present a future needs, and so 
does not regard the maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in itself but only as a 
means for bringing about the best results in the present case.’” Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996)). 
 116.  853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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sexual orientation.118 Hearing the case en banc, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court and the Seventh Circuit panel rulings to hold that 
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination contem-
plated by Title VII.119
As Judge Posner admitted in his concurring opinion in Hively, the ma-
jority’s conclusion is the product of “imposing” a modern will upon Title 
VII120 because the statute simply required an update.121 Instead of interpret-
ing Title VII based on what Congress actually enacted, the eight judges 
who joined the court’s judgment apparently believed that it need not wait 
for Congress to impose the will of the people on the statute. Recognizing 
the “robust debate” and “striking cultural change” associated with recogni-
tion of homosexuals’ rights,122 the three dissenters believed that the power 
to determine whether sexual orientation ought to be prohibited by Title VII 
laid with Congress, not with the courts, because “sexual-orientation dis-
crimination is broadly recognized as an independent category of discrimi-
nation.”123 Judge Sykes’ dissent acknowledges that sexual orientation 
discrimination is unjust,124 but clarifies that “[o]ur constitutional structure 
requires [courts] to respect the difference” between areas of law that permit 
judge-made law and those that defer to the people’s elected representa-
tives.125
Of course, Hively’s holding itself is immaterial here. How the judges 
came to their respective conclusions, on the other hand, highlights how 
functionalist judicial decisionmaking tends to unilaterally settle controver-
sial political debates, thus raising separation of powers concerns. To be 
clear, those on both sides of the political aisle, and their corresponding 
judicial philosophies, have this problem. The risk that judges will impose 
their will when deciding cases, as opposed to mere judgment, leads candi-
dates for political office to vow to nominate and support only those judges 
likely to rule in favor of politically desirable results. While federal judicial 
nominations and confirmations are necessarily political at some basic level, 
 118.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56) (as initially amended 
in 1991); Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. 
 119.  See Hively, 853 F.3d at 351-52 (holding that “a person who alleges that she experienced 
employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimina-
tion for Title VII purposes”). 
 120.  Id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 121.  Id. at 353. 
 122.  Id. at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 123.  Id. at 364-65. 
 124.  Id. at 372. 
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judicial confirmation proceedings have only recently become major na-
tionwide political spectacles.126
Take Judge Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court nomination as an ex-
ample. Judge Garland’s nomination, and the lack of subsequent confirma-
tion hearings, “undoubtedly will go down as not only a transparently 
political act on the part of the majority but also as a precedent upholding a 
majority’s entitlement to paralyze the Supreme Court selection process 
until or unless a president to its liking comes into office.”127 And after Pres-
ident Trump and Senate Republicans successfully placed then-Judge Neil 
Gorsuch on the Supreme Court instead of Judge Garland, they set a prece-
dent that effectively permits the majority party to “reserve seats [on the 
Supreme Court] for the nominees of [its] political party.”128 Notably, one of 
the most outspoken critics of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, Sena-
tor Lindsey Graham, did not shy away from emphasizing his political gain 
resulting from now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to the Supreme 
Court: “When the GOP maintains control of the Senate, the conservative 
judicial train is going to keep running!”129
This attitude proves that politicians seek to use lifetime judicial tenure 
to impose their political platforms. To bring it full circle, the functionalist 
tendency exhibited in Hively fuels this attitude by assuring that sitting fed-
eral judges (or potential future judges) will unilaterally impose these politi-
cal platforms in their respective judicial roles. 
These hyper-partisan tendencies in the judicial confirmation process 
have escalated into a situation where we care little about what makes nom-
inees qualified; we care instead about how nominees may be disquali-
fied.130 This is the attitude that led to the hotly-contested Brett Kavanaugh 
nomination in 2018. And it is the attitude that Chief Justice John Roberts 
 126.  See Michael J. Gerhardt & Richard W. Painter, Majority Rule and the Future of Judicial 
Selection, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 263, 275 (2017) (“While politics has always been a significant element in 
the confirmation process for judges, the process has become increasingly infused with partisan politics, 
and public confidence in government—particularly in the Congress—falters and erodes.”). 
 127.  Id. at 272. 
 128.  Id.
 129.  Megan Keller, Graham Louds GOP Senate Results: ‘Conservative Judicial Train Is Going to 
Keep Running!’, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/415396-graham-lauds-gop-senate-results-conservative-judicial-
train-is-going-to-keep [https://perma.cc/Y8EZ-QDUV]. 
 130.  Aimee Brown, Judicial Confirmation Through the Lens of Constitutional Interpretive Theory,
80 ALB. L. REV. 807, 815-16 (2017) (citing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 159, 206 (1994)) (discussing and criticizing “the 
search to disqualify”). As a point of clarification, Aimee Brown’s discussion about “the search to 
disqualify” uses examples from Justice Clarence Thomas’s contentious confirmation hearings in 1991. 
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has attempted to halt in its tracks. The Chief Justice has tried to paint the 
Roberts Court as one that reins in the judicial beast, whereas the two politi-
cal branches seem to enable it. Most recently, the Chief Justice publicly 
declared that “[p]eople need to know that [judges are] not doing politics,” 
but that they are “doing something different, that [they’re] applying the 
law.”131 As one journalist noted, Chief Justice Roberts “has made little 
secret of his desire to protect the federal judiciary’s institutional reputation 
amid increasingly partisan confirmation battles.”132
More concretely, the Chief Justice has deviated from the unwritten 
rules of judicial conduct in the name of institutional integrity: he confront-
ed the President of the United States.133 In response to President Trump’s 
criticism of an “Obama judge” on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Chief Justice remarked that “[w]e do not have Obama judges or Trump 
judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an extraordinary 
group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those 
appearing before them. That independent judiciary is something we should 
all be thankful for.”134 Given that even a Supreme Court justice’s passive
expressions of disagreement with the President are considered “unbecom-
ingly political for a Supreme Court justice,”135 the Chief Justice’s direct
response to President Trump is undoubtedly a momentous affair.136
Chief Justice Roberts’ reproach of President Trump for the sake of 
“the independent judiciary” only confirms the suspicion that the walls of 
separation surrounding the Judicial Branch need immediate repairs (and 
that he might even entertain this Note’s proposal). The Chief Justice has 
also decided cases in recent years with an eye toward restoring judicial 
independence and confidence in the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its constitu-
tional duties with the utmost impartiality. In 2012, for example, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts announced the judgment of the court in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, which upheld the highly controversial 
 131.  Greg Stohr, Hold the Revolution: Roberts Keeps Joining High Court Liberals, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 1, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/hold-the-revolution-
roberts-keeps-joining-high-court-liberals [https://perma.cc/FHN8-5L3J]. 
 132.  Id.
 133.  See Joan Biskupic, Why Chief Justice John Roberts Spoke Out, CNN (Nov. 22, 2018, 3:26 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/21/politics/trump-roberts-judges-judiciary/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ZB2-T5U9]. 
 134.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135.  Scott Stossel, Trump Versus the Judiciary, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/chief-justice-roberts-corrects-president-
trump/579997/ [https://perma.cc/XJJ9-CMFC] (noting Justice Samuel Alito’s outward reaction to 
President Obama’s criticism of Citizens United in his 2010 State of the Union address). 
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Affordable Care Act.137 Siding with the Court’s “liberal wing,” the Chief 
Justice advocated that the Court not get involved in political decisionmak-
ing because doing so would be outside the bounds of the judiciary’s care-
fully delineated constitutional role.138 Reasoning that the Framers intended 
clear distinctions between the branches of government, he concluded that it 
is Congress—not the judiciary—that holds the power to judge the “wisdom 
of the Affordable Care Act.”139 As perhaps his most popular vote contrary 
to his fellow conservative justices, the Chief Justice in Sebelius sought to 
stop political influence from breaching the walls of separation between the 
judiciary and Congress. 
Especially after Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts has continued to 
champion judicial independence and institutional integrity in the face of 
mounting threats of internal and external political influence. For what it is 
worth, the Chief Justice “provided the fifth vote for a liberal outcome in a 
case argued before the [Supreme C]ourt only four times” in his first twelve 
years on the Court.140 Yet he has already provided this swing vote three 
times in the year and a half between October 2017 until March 2019.141
Given the hot judicial confirmation processes that have taken place since 
President Obama nominated Judge Garland to the Supreme Court, the 
Chief Justice’s attitude is no coincidence; it is a deliberate effort to act on 
the fears first theorized by Alexander Hamilton.142
 B. Problems of Institutional Legitimacy Are Better Addressed at the 
Appellate Court Level, Not at the Supreme Court. 
1. The Courts of Appeals Are the Court of Last Resort for the Vast 
Majority of Litigants. 
The Supreme Court of the United States is, for the most part, a court 
of discretionary review.143 But it was not always able to choose the cases 
 137.  567 U.S. 519, 528-29 (2012). 
 138.  See id. at 588. 
 139.  See id.
 140.  Stohr, supra note 131. 
 141.  Id.
 142.  See also id. (quoting Cato Institute lawyer, Ilya Shapiro, arguing that Roberts’ behavior does 
not “mean[ ] he’s changing his mind on the substance of big important issues on which he’s written 
opinions. . . . But at the margin he’s trying to make fewer partisan splits”). 
 143.  See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of 
Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 799 (1983) (explaining the 1978 legislation that granted 
the Supreme Court “almost total discretion to select the cases it will hear and decide”); see generally 
Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, Appeals and Petitions for Certiorari, 1970-2017, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-supreme-court-united-states-appeals-and-
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that comprise its docket; before 1891, the Court’s primary efforts were that 
of reviewing cases for error144 according to statutes that provided for com-
pulsory Supreme Court review.145 This changed, however, upon creation of 
the intermediate appellate courts.146
As one commentator points out, the Evarts Act of 1891, which created 
the modern intermediate appellate courts, “marked the first stage in the 
attrition of the error-correcting function of the Supreme Court.”147 The first 
actual change in the Supreme Court’s docket, however, came with the Judi-
ciary Act of 1925, which “rested explicitly on a theory of the Supreme 
Court’s role that excluded the mere correction of error.”148 The Chief Jus-
tice at the time acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s job was not simply 
to resolve disputes, but to consider only those “cases whose decision in-
volves principles, the application of which are [sic] of wide public or gov-
ernmental interest.”149 The 1925 Act codified this mode of thinking by 
granting rights of appeal that seek to correct errors in the circuit courts of 
appeals150 and by “limiting the classes of cases to which review was avail-
able as of right” to the Supreme Court.151 Appeals therefore became an 
insignificant portion of the Supreme Court’s docket.152
Since 1925, then, the Supreme Court’s focus on discretionary review 
has fixated on answering “questions of constitutionality and like problems 
of essentially national importance.”153 Nevertheless the Supreme Court 
remained unnecessarily obligated to hear appeals in many situations.154 So 
starting again in 1970, and ultimately culminating in 1988,155 Congress and 
petitions and appeals granted from 1970 through 2017 from the Journal of the Supreme Court of the 
United States); see also, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER 
2016 TERM, at II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JKC-
SNHT] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (74 of the 75 cases granted review came from petitions for certiorari). 
 144.  Hellman, supra note 143, at 797. 
 145.  See id. at 799 n.27 (citing statutes). 
 146.  See id. at 797. 
 147.  Id.
 148.  Id. at 797-98. 
 149.  Id. at 798 (alteration in original). 
 150.  See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936-37 (1925). 
 151.  Hellman, supra note 143, at 798. 
 152.  Id.
 153.  Id.
 154.  See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963) (opposing direct 
appeals in antitrust cases); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364-65 (1962) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (same). 
 155.  See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 1-6, 102 Stat. 662, 662-64 (1988) (elimi-
nating the three provisions that provided for the majority of the Supreme Court’s obligatory jurisdic-
tion—28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2), and 1257(2), and amending language of Supreme Court review 
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the Supreme Court coordinated efforts to rid the Court of its “obligatory 
jurisdiction.”156 The 1988 law that “provid[ed] greater discretion to the 
Supreme Court in selecting cases it will review”157 started as an unques-
tioned proposal in 1978.158 Though many believed that the Supreme Court 
should not be a court of complete discretion,159 there remained a “consen-
sus of Congress, the bar, and the judiciary that review for error should play, 
at best, a minor part in the Court’s work.”160 In fact, the Supreme Court 
expressed its unanimous support for the removal of their mandatory juris-
diction four times between 1978 and 1988.161 The major part of the Su-
preme Court’s work should instead “correspond to the specific functions 
entrusted to the Court in the American system of government,” such as 
“[(1)] delineating the limits of governmental authority as against claims of 
individual liberty; [(2)] marking the boundaries between state and national 
power; [(3)] interpreting and clarifying the vast body of federal statutory 
and common law; and [(4)] supervising the operation of the federal 
courts.”162
In eliminating the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction, 
Congress intended to place the burden of maintaining systemic judicial 
integrity and confidence, at least in large part, with the federal appellate 
courts. Reasoning that the appellate courts are better equipped to resolve 
many of the cases that the Supreme Court had historically decided, Con-
gress concluded that affording nearly complete discretionary review to the 
Supreme Court would have little impact on the orderly resolution of cas-
es.163
What is more, the Supreme Court has heard an average of about 
eighty-three cases each term since 2000; it has heard no fewer than sixty-
six and no more than ninety-nine.164 This number, compared with the num-
ber of cases entertained by the intermediate appellate courts—average of 
54,050 each year from 2013 to 2018165—and the number of requests for 
 156.  Hellman, supra note 143, at 798-99. 
 157.  102 Stat. at 662 (title of the Act). 
 158.  Hellman, supra note 143, at 799-800. 
 159.  Id. at 799 n.33 (comparing Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter’s opposing views on 
the role of the Supreme Court). 
 160.  Id. at 799. 
 161.  See 134 Cong. Rec. 4465 (1988); see also H.R. REP. 100-660, at 2, 2 n.1 (1988). 
 162.  Hellman, supra note 143, at 801. 
 163.  See H.R. REP. 100-660, at 12. 
 164.  See Caseloads, supra note 143. 
 165.  U.S. Court of Appeals – Judicial Caseload Profile, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
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review filed in the Supreme Court—average of about 7,073 from the 2010 
term through the 2017 term166—is miniscule. Therefore, as important and 
powerful as the Supreme Court’s role may be—which is certainly not to be 
diminished—it is not necessarily the best target to effect institutional re-
forms since having the opportunity to be heard before the Supreme Court is 
so rare. Unlike much of this Note’s discussion thus far, there is little, if any, 
debate that the appellate courts are the critical level of the federal court 
system.167 When rehabilitating the judiciary’s reputation, then, we should 
focus our attention on the appellate courts, where litigants may be heard on 
appeal as of right.168
2. Reforming the Appellate Courts Is More Worthy of Congress’ Ef-
forts Because It Is More Realistic. 
Unlike changes to the makeup of the Supreme Court, changes to the 
lower courts go largely unnoticed by the general public. While a large 
chunk of Donald Trump’s presidency has been spent examining, and ulti-
mately confirming, his two Supreme Court nominees, he successfully nom-
inated eighty-three other federal judges in just his first two years in office, 
thirty of which now sit on courts of appeals all over the country.169 Though 
it may well be true that President Trump is seating federal judges at a rec-
ord pace,170 it is not unusual for presidents to nominate, and for the Senate 
to confirm, large numbers of district court and appellate court judges over 
the course of a presidency.171 The public is simply unaware of these nomi-
nations and confirmations because they are not publicized in the way that 
Supreme Court nominees are roped into the national spotlight. 
The public is less aware of lower court confirmation proceedings per-
haps because the vetting process is much quicker and less controversial, but 
more importantly because they cause elected officials to risk less political 
capital than with Supreme Court confirmation battles. It is these qualities 
 166.  Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, Appendices to the 2013-17 Year-
End Reports, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/year-endreports.aspx [https://perma.cc/PU73-ZRD6] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
 167.  See Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 
905-06 (2018) (“[A]ppellate court openings remain more critical because circuit judges are fewer, their 
opinions cover several jurisdictions and consistently enunciate greater policy, and lawmakers continual-
ly insist on assigning nearly every appellate vacancy to the identical state where openings arise.”). 
 168.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56); Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 
135 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2015). 
 169.  See Judgeship Appointments by President, USCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M3S-GBJ9] (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2019). 
 170.  See id.
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that show why structural reform in the courts of appeals is much more wor-
thy of Congress’s efforts instead of trying to manipulate Supreme Court 
processes (such as scathing, nationally-televised confirmation hearings). 
Put differently, congresspersons are much more willing to undertake re-
forms that are outside the public eye and which, therefore, do not compro-
mise political capital. 
To put it more concretely, lower court confirmation proceedings are 
less substantive than Supreme Court proceedings.172 In recent years, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s vetting process for lower court judgeships 
“lacked important content and context.”173 And members on the Committee 
“rarely engaged on substantive issues, even on matters which distinctly 
involved qualifications essential to public office who hold unlimited ten-
ure.”174 Moreover, the majority party in the Senate can unilaterally decide 
not to follow the traditions and rules of confirmation proceedings.175 In 
sum, and especially with respect to proceedings that lack substance and 
public accountability, the Senate’s majority party has the power to accom-
plish agendas regarding the lower courts without risking political accounta-
bility. Notwithstanding the wisdom of this kind of arbitrary rule, such 
happenings suggest that Congress need not fear structural reforms to the 
appellate court system. 
IV. WHY THE FIVE-JUDGE SYSTEM IS THE SOLUTION
This Note proposes two reasons as to why Congress should at least 
begin considering an increase in the number of circuit judges that sit on 
federal appellate panels: first, five-judge panels promote more ideologically 
 172.  In keeping with the spirit of this Note, congresspersons ought to spend more time and effort 
considering the qualifications of lower court judicial nominees because they impact the lives of litigants 
much more regularly than do Supreme Court justices. But that is not the subject of this Note, and other 
commentators have already addressed this issue. See generally, e.g., Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal 
Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2018). Given that this is the modern practice 
during lower court confirmation proceedings, this Note suggests that congresspersons use that practice 
to reform the appellate courts. 
 173.  Tobias, supra note 171, at 900. 
 174.  Id.
 175.  See, e.g., id. at 900-01 (refusing to wait for ABA evaluations and ratings before voting on 
nominees); Salvador Rizzo, Are Senate Republicans Killing ‘Blue Slip’ for Court Nominees?, WASH.
POST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/21/are-senate-
republicans-killing-blue-slip-for-court-nominees/?utm_term=.4ffe280aea80 [https://perma.cc/BG8A-
WWV7] (noting that Senate Democrats ended the 60-vote confirmation requirement when they con-
trolled the Senate in 2013, and that Senate Republicans ended the filibuster power when they were in 
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balanced decisions;176 and second, five-judge panels keep with Congress’s 
tradition of using panel size to improve institutional legitimacy. 
A. Five-Judge Appellate Panels Encourage Mixture of More            
Jurisprudential Philosophies. 
Despite what Alexander Hamilton said in FEDERALIST 78, studies 
show that there is of course some basic level of political influence in judi-
cial decisionmaking, for “the outcome of a case often depends in part on 
whether a Republican or Democratic president appointed the judges.”177
This conclusion is not just dependent on whether there are two republican 
appointees and one democratic appointee on a particular panel; it makes a 
difference whether there is a two-to-one majority panel or a 3-0 unanimous 
panel.178 This is the first element of discussion that must be hashed out. 
Studies conclude that a 3-0 decision by judges with the same basic ju-
risprudential philosophy (conservative or liberal) is driven by partisanship 
to a much greater extent than a two-to-one ideologically mixed panel.179 To 
solve the problem of ideological partisanship in the appellate courts, Pro-
fessors Shapiro and Murphy recommend expanding panel size, albeit for 
only a small portion of especially important cases.180 Despite their narrow 
approach to five-judge panels, their reasoning holds true regardless the 
scope of the five-judge panel scheme. Professors Shapiro and Murphy in-
troduce their proposal by explaining that selecting five judges from a pool 
of active and senior judges increases the likelihood of having a mixed panel 
than with selecting only three judges.181 Of course the likelihood differs 
depending on the ideological makeup of each circuit, but “[e]ven for a 
 176.  Section IV.A relies primarily on an article focusing on the impact that five-judge appellate 
panels would have on administrative law decisions. See generally Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 80. 
While this Note does not have such a narrow focus, administrative law studies and analysis provide the 
best insight into how to counteract ideologically polarized panels because administrative law cases 
require more political decisionmaking than most other types of cases, such as contract disputes. 
 177.  Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 80, at 323-27 (explaining a study about ideological influence 
in administrative law decisions). 
 178.  See id. at 323-24. 
 179.  Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2173 (1998); Shapiro & Mur-
phy, supra note 80, at 323-24; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbi-
trariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 784-85 (2008) (suggesting that voting patterns depend on the 
initial makeup of court panels); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870-71 (2006) (explaining that 
democratic appointees are more likely to uphold liberal decisions and republican appointees are more 
likely to uphold conservative decisions). 
 180.  Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 80, at 356. 
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quite-lopsided pool, however, the effect of increasing panel size can be 
substantial.”182 Consider the following: 
[I]n a hypothetical Twelfth Circuit composed of nothing but ten Repub-
licans, increasing panel size for the court would not reduce the likelihood 
that a random draw of judges would produce an unmixed panel—the 
likelihood would remain 100 percent. Add just one Democrat to the mix, 
however, and the likelihood of randomly selecting a three-Republican 
panel is about 73 percent; increase panel size to five judges, and this 
likelihood drops to about 55 percent.183
Given that even one judge with an opposing ideological stance can 
impact how judges vote,184 a system that increases the likelihood of sitting 
mixed ideological panels is something to strive for. 
Following this proposal addresses the concerns described supra Part 
III. As previously discussed, Alexander Hamilton greatly feared a judicial 
department that would accept internal or external political influences. To 
the extent that judges have inherent political tendencies that they cannot 
easily detach from their judicial decisionmaking, however, the solution 
should rest on minimizing the impact of those tendencies to the extent pos-
sible. With the understanding that mixed three-judge panels “behave in a 
less ideological manner than purely partisan panels do,” we have “little 
reason to think that this mixed-panel effect would not translate (at least in 
large part) from a three-judge to a five-judge setting.”185 A five-judge panel 
system, then, “provides a means to depoliticize” the appellate courts with-
out disturbing the separation of powers balance among the three branches 
of government.186
B. Five-Judge Panels Would Improve the Legitimacy of Court        
Decisions. 
In combating fears over the judiciary’s dangerousness, the appearance 
of legitimacy is just as important as balancing judges’ inherent political 
 182.  Id.
 183.  Id. at 357. 
 184.  See id. at 323-24. 
 185.  Id. at 361. 
 186.  See id. That this solution does not disturb the powers of the other branches refers specifically 
to the suggestion that Congress could simply require three-judge panels to be mixed. But as Shapiro and 
Murphy argue, such a solution would disturb the well-understood notion that judges do not impose will, 
but merely judgment. See id. at 359-60. This solution would, in other words, constitute “a frontal as-
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tendencies.187 Congress itself has recognized as much.188 The same logic 
that Congress relied on to permit expanded panels on the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals and require, at a minimum, three-judge panels on all oth-
er appellate courts flows to five-judge panel systems. As discussed supra
Section II.C.2,189 Congress permits Federal Circuit judges to assemble ex-
panded panels depending on the circumstances because of the particular 
importance of those cases.190 Congress has even expanded the reach of this 
reasoning to include all appellate courts, such that hearing appeals with less 
than three judges should not become the norm.191
Congress came to these conclusions for the sake of improving the le-
gitimacy of judicial decisions. As the legislative history to the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 confirms, “to persevere both the appear-
ance and the reality of justice . . . the disposition of an appeal should be the 
collective product of at least three minds.”192 One commentator points out 
that this thought process has faded only because lawyers, public officials, 
and the public at large have come to trust the Federal Circuit’s operation.193
For this reason, the Federal Circuit has largely stopped using expanded 
panels. It follows, though, that when concerns over the judiciary’s institu-
tional legitimacy again come to the fore, Congress ought to consider ex-
panding panel size once again. That time has come. 
Some may argue, however, that more judges on each case would lead 
to more dissenting and concurring opinions, thus leading to less certainty in 
what the law is or what the law should be. This has, for example, been the 
case in the Supreme Court, where there are regularly numerous opinions on 
individual cases. But given the evidence supporting mixed ideological pan-
els and providing the benefits of more perspectives on individual cases, the 
development of the what the law is and should be deserves more opinions. 
This has been true with the Supreme Court, as we want nine judges to 
opine in each important and impactful case in that Court, and is likely to be 
true with added judges in federal appellate court cases. 
 187.  See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A judge 
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”). 
 188.  See supra Sections II.B and II.C.2. 
 189.  This Section pertains to much of the background explained in Section II.C.2 regarding the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Accordingly, this Section ought to be read in conjunction 
with Section II.C.2 above. 
 190.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56). 
 191.  See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 9 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 192.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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The public is also more likely to see judicial decisions as “correct” 
when there are more judges that contemplate them.194 This theory has not 
only been applied to appellate panel decisionmaking,195 but has been ap-
plied in the context of juries.196 Since the instructions contained in Article 
III and FEDERALIST 78 require a truly independent judiciary, it is impera-
tive that the public sees that judges are not merely tools to accomplish po-
litical agendas; they must be seen as making respectable and prudent 
judgments. Chief Justice Roberts has attempted to make this become reali-
ty, but the people need more. Implementing a five-judge panel system 
across all courts of appeals faithfully follows the Framers’ instructions 
while bringing us closer to a truly independent and trustworthy judiciary 
once again. 
C. Compromise May Be Necessary for the Sake of Practicality 
If this proposal is such a common-sense idea given the way Congress 
has acted in the past, then why has it never even been seriously discussed? 
There are many legitimate objections to such a broad application of a five-
judge panel system. But because the five-judge system is so malleable, 
Congress has no reason to refuse to consider it. In any event, Congress will 
need to clear several sizable hurdles to implement this reform. 
The first, and most obvious, is that such a system may not be statisti-
cally possible. It is beyond doubt that the lower federal courts are already 
massively overworked. 197 Not twenty years ago, and lasting for over seven 
years, the Fifth Circuit went so far as to declare a “Judicial Emergency” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) because they did not have enough active judges 
assigned to the Fifth Circuit to adequately staff their ever-growing dock-
et.198 The Eleventh Circuit declared a similar state of emergency in 2013.199
 194.  See Three-Judge Court Act, supra note 24, at 206 (citing the remarks of Senator Brown, 45 
Cong. Rec. 7257 (1910), and Senator Overman, 45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910)) (“Whenever one judge 
stands up in a state and enjoins the [state], the people resent it . . . whereas if three judges declare that a 
statute is unconstitutional the people would rest easy.”). 
 195.  See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 80, at 359-60 (“[E]specially important cases should have 
large panels to increase the likelihood of correct results.”). 
 196.  See Philip J. Boland, Majority Systems and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 38 THE 
STATISTICIAN, no. 3, 1989, at 181, 188 (“[M]ajority systems can achieve . . . high reliability (or high 
probability of making the correct decision) as the size of the system (decision body) increases . . . .”). 
 197.  See David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 47, 61-62 (2013) (acknowledging the growing concern of federal caseloads); Jason Mazzone & 
Carl Emery Woock, Federalism as Docket Control: Federalism as Dock Control, 94 N.C. L. REV. 7, 63 
(2015) (discussing the growth of federal court dockets). 
 198.  See Order Vacating a Declaration of Judicial Emergency Under 28 U.S. Code, Section 46(b), 
2007 WL 43971 (Jan. 8, 2007). Note that the Fifth Circuit’s 1999 emergency declaration was the sec-
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The Eleventh Circuit there exempted itself out of the § 46(b) requirement 
that a majority of its panels consist of Eleventh Circuit judges so it could 
establish “emergency panels consisting of one Eleventh Circuit judge and 
two visiting judges.”200 These emergency panels sat throughout the 2014 
calendar year and resolved over 100 cases for the circuit.201 Even more 
frightening, however, is that these two examples are only microcosms of 
the broader issue about overloaded federal dockets.202
Given the indisputable facts surrounding federal appellate caseloads, a 
compromise is probably necessary; it may well be plainly unrealistic to add 
two judges to every single federal appeal. This is especially true since most 
appeals are either unanimous decisions or easily disposed of, for not every 
appeal necessarily deserves a form of heightened review.203 At least until 
federal court vacancy problems are resolved and courts can stabilize their 
dockets, Congress could simply expand the language of § 46(c) to permit 
not only the Federal Circuit to sit in expanded panels at their election, but 
also permit the other twelve circuit courts of appeals to so elect. In the 
meantime, this solution need not worsen the docket situation, and yet 
would permit courts to reap the benefits of seating five-judge panels in 
particularly important or complex cases if they so choose. 
But doesn’t the en banc system authorized by § 46(c) already permit 
this type of elective expansion of appellate panels? Section 46(c), after all, 
authorizes the courts of appeals to order a hearing or rehearing before all 
active circuit judges and any senior judges that originally heard the appeal. 
The problem is that federal rules disfavor en banc hearings across the 
board.204 Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, en banc hearings 
should be ordered only for the purposes of obtaining circuit uniformity and 
 199.  Andrew L. Adler, Extended Vacancies, Crushing Caseloads, and Emergency Panels in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 15 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 163, 163-64 (2014). 
 200.  Id.
 201.  Id.
 202.  See id. at 165 (explaining the courts of appeals’ “crisis in volume”). Note that the caseload 
issue also introduces concerns that judges will issue more unpublished, nonprecedential opinions for 
efficiency’s sake. See, e.g., Williams v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(mem.) (Smith, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that the primary purpose for 
issuing unpublished opinions is to promote more efficient resolution of cases). 
 203.  See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1898-99 (2009) 
(explaining that about one-half of court of appeals cases are “easy,” and that cases “more often than not 
lead to a unanimous judgment”). 
 204.  FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not 
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addressing exceptionally important issues.205 But the five-judge panel sys-
tem proposed here suggests institutional concerns not involving circuit 
uniformity or important legal issues generally. Rather, this Note is con-
cerned with the merits of individual cases and the appearance of improprie-
ty stemming therefrom. Accordingly, this Note proposes using expanded 
panels to decide cases even where there is no worry over circuit uniformity 
or issues of broad applicability. Moreover, given the admittedly legitimate 
concerns over adding just two judges to appellate panels, it follows that it 
would be even more unrealistic to simply use the en banc system more 
frequently, for the latter system adds all active judges on the circuit to the 
case. 
Yet another concern worries that the president in office at the time 
Congress adopts the five-judge panel system would be able to take ad-
vantage of the large number of appellate court vacancies to stack the ex-
panded panels. Given that the appellate courts are already overworked, 
Congress would likely establish new active seats on the courts of appeals at 
the same time it expands appellate panels. But Congress has established 
new seats on federal courts many times without worrying that the president 
would revive attempts to recklessly stack the federal courts.206 And where 
Congress is concerned with court-packing, it can—and indeed has—set a 
limit on how many judges the president can nominate before the next pres-
ident is inaugurated.207 Therefore, this concern lacks merit sufficient to 
invalidate this Note’s proposition. 
These worries are no doubt genuine ones, but they are worries com-
mon to our long-standing maintenance of the judiciary. Case overloads are 
commonly addressed by local administrative resolutions or by congression-
al intervention. And if five-judge panels are unnecessary for the vast major-
ity of easy cases, for instance, Congress can prescribe the framework for 
utilizing five-judge panels such that they become an effective and mallea-
ble administrative tool. In any event, these concerns cannot outweigh the 
horrifying consequences of standing idly by and watching the walls of sep-
aration fall, alongside our liberty. 
 205.  Id.; see also United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Western 
Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 256-59 (1953)) (“The function of en banc hearings 
is not to review alleged errors for the benefit of losing litigants.”). 
 206.  See generally, e.g., H.R. REP. 101-733 (1990) (accompanying the Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990, focusing on filling vacancies and solving the case overload problem without regard to giving 
President Bush the power to appoint nine circuit judges and fifty district judges). 
 207.  See, e.g., Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 
201(a), (c), 98 Stat. 333, 346-48 (1984) (permitting the President to nominate no more than eleven 
circuit judges and no more than twenty-nine district judges prior to January 21, 1985, which would be 
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a system that would drastically impact the daily 
life of not only circuit judges, but also their law clerks, other staff mem-
bers, individual litigants, and the public at large. These concerns are, how-
ever, in conflict with what Alexander Hamilton tokened the most perilous 
risk to liberty: attrition of the independent judiciary. Whether Congress 
decides to require five-judge panels for all appeals, adopt a five-judge sys-
tem similar to that in Louisiana or the Federal Circuit, or implement some 
other form of five-judge system, it is time to do something to rehabilitate 
the walls of separation that insulate the federal judiciary. But given the 
present tumultuous political culture, Congress’s options are significantly 
curtailed. As a practical and malleable solution, however, Congress can, 
and should, feel comfort in taking up the proposal suggested in this Note to 
restore the federal judiciary to its once-independent and nonpartisan roots. 
